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10887

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff seeks specific performance of a written
instnm1ent. Defendants ask dismissal of the Plaintiff's Complaint and judgment for its costs of suit
incurred in this proceeding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendants adopt and agree with the statement
in Plaintiff's Brief as to disposition in the Lower
Court, with one exception. In the last paragraph on
Page 2 of its Brief, Plaintiff did not inform the
Comt that a copy of the proposed Revised Findings
and Conclusions filed with the Lower Court on Janu1

ary 6, 1967, were made available to counsel fo1· Plaintiff at the same time. Plaintiff's counsel had the
opportunity to examine and study the proposed Revised Findings and Conclusions for at least five weeks
prior to the hearing in Provo, Utah on February 21,
1967. At the hearing in February, Plaintiff's counsel argued at length, and also submitted a written
brief, in opposition to the proposed Findings and
Conclusions tendered by Defendants' counsel. The
Plaintiff was therefore given ample opportunity to
oppose the proposed Findings and Conclusions which
were subsequently adopted by the Trial Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
To avoid excessive repetition, in this Brief, the
Defendants will usually refer to the Plaintiff as
"Tosco," to the Defendant, Frederick H. Larson, as
"Larson" and Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 (the letter
of July 25, 1963 and the memorandum of July 11,
1963) as the "July Letter."
Tosco's Statement of Facts, although factually
correct in most respects, omits vital parts of the
record which are of importance to any decision in this
case. Also, in some areas, Tosco's Statement of Facts
constitutes argument rather than factual summary.
Defendants offer the following supplement and comment regarding Tosco's Statement of Facts:
A. Throughout its Brief, Tosco constantly refers to the July Letter as "the Agreement of July
25, 1963." By doing so Tosco places special and re-

lJeated emphasis upon an instrument which, by its
own terms, is identified as a "letter" (see Page 1
thereof), the purpose of which was to" .... state the
intention of Tosco and the shareholders of Larson
Oil Co., as modified on July 24, to hereafter enter
into contracts and ag1·eements giving expression
to those understandings as they pertain to the holding of Larson Oil Co."
B. On Page 6 of its Brief, Tosco states as follows: "They [Tosco and Defendants] also agreed
that the option would not commence until the payment of the $20,000.00 and the signing of formal
documents." This constitutes Tosco's interpretation
of the July Letter. The instrument is silent as to the
commencement or ending dates of the option. The
record does disclose :
1. In the New York Meeting of July 9
and 10, 1963, Larson and Tosco agreed that
the option period would commence July 15,
1963 and end January 15, 1964 (Tosco Brief,
Page 5);
2. The understandings of the pa1ties in
New York on July 9 and 10, which resulted in
a memorandum of July 11, 1963, were incorporated in the July Letter;
3. The drafts prepared by Tosco's attorney, Mr. Tweedy, specified option dates of
June 15, 1963 to January 15, 1964, and the
leases attached to those drafts as Exhibit "A"
provided that the proposed lease was to start
January 15, 1964 (Pl's. Exs. 14and16);
4. The drafts prepared by Larson's
3

counsel in N ovembe1· and December of 1963,
used the same beginning, ending and lease
dates, and
5. The drafts of a transaction prepal'ed
by Tweedy in February of 1964, also called
for the option to Commence July 15, 1963 and
expire January 15, 1964. (Pl's. Exs. 17 and
18.)
C. On the bottom of Page 6 and at the top of
Page 7 of its Brief, Tosco states: "Thereupon a new
letter agreement of July 25, 1963, which the Trial
Court found binding on both parties, was drafted
in Larson's presence." (Emphasis supplied.) This
statement is not correct. A review of the initial
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by
the Trial Court on November 1, 1966 and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as revised and
entered by the Court on January 6, 1967, will conclusively show that the July Letter, in and by itself,
was never considered as being binding upon the parties by the Trial Court, or for that matter, by the
parties themselves. (TR-1, Pg. 115 L 20-28; TR-1,
Pg. 78, L 16-25.)
D. The statement in Subparagraph 3 on Page
8 of Tosco's Brief is incorrect. Here, Tosco states
that the issuance of shares of Tosco stock was to be
"subject to appropriate investment representations
in compliance with the Federal Securities Law."
(Emphasis supplied.) The July Letter provides that
said shares were to be issued to Defendants "subject
4

to the delive1·y to it [Tosco] of appropriate investment representation from the recipients and subject
to such other terms and conditions as may, in the
opinion of counsel be required for compliance with
the Federal Securities Law." (Emphasis supplied.)
E. By its statement that Larson and his attorney "made some minor changes to conform the
drafts to the July 25 agreement, such as substituting
the individual shareholders as parties . . .", (see
Page 9 of Tosco's Brief) Tosco infers that drafts of
documents prepared by Tweedy, Tosco's attorney,
(Plaintiff's Exs. 4 & 5) contained those understandings which were expressed in the July letter. To the
contrary, at the time Tweedy prepared Plaintiff's
Exhibits 4 and 5, he had no knowledge of the discussions which transpired between Larson, Koolsbergen
and ·winston in Beverly Hills, California, on July
2:3 and 24, 1963. (TR-1, Pg. 143 L 15-21.)
F. On Page 11 of its Brief, Tosco quotes certain portions of the July Letter with the comment
that the quoted portions of the lette1· constitute the
"relevant terms" thereof. Such a statement is purely
argumentative and obviously designed only to emphasize Tosco's position. Factually the quoted portions constitute a small part of the instrument in
question and are certainly not all of the relevant
terms.
G. On Page 12 of its Brief, Tosco quotes a
portion of the testimony given by its attorney,
5

Tweedy. However, additional testimony by Tweedy
concerning his telephone conversation with Larson is
of extreme importance in this case. When pressed
for a definite answer as to exactly what type of
documents Larson agreed to sign, Mr. Tweedy finally stated that Larson had advised him that the Defendants would sign documents if Defendants' attorney and Tweedy could reach an agreement as to the
differences then existing between Tosco and Defendants. (TR-1, Pg. 148 L 8-28.) Tosco also fails to inform the Court that Koolsbergen acknowledged that
Tosco paid the $20,000.00 to Defendants on the "expectation" that Defendants would execute formal
agreements if Tweedy and Larson's counsel could
resolve the matters in dispute. (TR-1, Pg. 100 L 1718.) Tweedy made no attempt to resolve those differences with Defendants' attorney. (TR-1, Pg. 148
L-23-30; Pg. 149 L 1-13.)
H. On Page 13 of its Brief, Tosco refers to payment of $20,000.00 by Tosco to the Defendants in the
form of four Tosco checks, each in the amount of
$5,000.00. Plaintiff does not advise the Court that
each of said checks bore a notation which showed the
checks were issued for options granted. (Pl's. Ex. 7.)
Of equal importance is the fact that the letter written to Larson by Tosco's' comptroller (Defs'. Ex. 10)
stated that the four Tosco checks were issued and
paid to Defendants "pursuant to the agreement."
I.

On Page 13 of its Brief, Tosco states that
6

'Tweedy called Larson's attorney to obtain consent for
a direct visitation with Larson in California. Here,
the Court should be advised that Tweedy requested
permission to talk with Larson only concerning property descriptions. (TR-1 Pg. 135 L 9-15; Pg. 149 L
1-8.) No request was made by Tweedy to discuss
with Larson the instruments he had prepared in February of 1964 (Pl's. Ex. 17 & 18).
J. Tosco does not advise the Court of these
events:
1. Tosco's engineer, Warriner, made an
examination of the Larson lands in August of
1963 and made a report of his examination to
Tosco. (TR-1, Pg. 80 L 12-27.)
2. Larson advised Tosco, both orally and
in writing, on numerous occasions, that the
option granted Tosco expired on January 15,
1964. (TR-1, Pg. 196 L 15-30; Pg. 197-all
and Pg. 198 L 1-10.) (See also Pl's. Ex. 3 and
Def's. Ex. 20 & 21.)
K. In its description of events related in the
second paragraph on Page 14 of its Brief, Tosco
cites only evidence submitted by its witnesses concerning the meeting between Larson and Tweedy in
Beverly Hills on February 12, 1964. The testimony
in this respect was conflicting and Larson testified
that Tweedy attempted to obtain Larson's approval
to a transaction completely different and foreign to
the understandings expressed in the July Letter
(TR-1, Pg. 28L10-30).
7

DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO TOSCO'S ARG11.
MENTS A AND B
A.

THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE TRIAL
COURT'S REFUSAL TO GRANT SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE OF THE JULY LETTER.

The contract alleged to exist by Tosco, consisting
solely of the July Letter, is indefinite, incomplete and
constitutes a mere agreement to agree. In a recent
opinion, this Court set forth the requirements of an
enforceable contract when it said in Pitcher v.
Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 ( 1967):
Specific performance cannot be required unless all terms of the agreement are clear. The
court cannot compel the performance of a contract which the parties did not mutually agree
upon. (Citing authority.)
In speaking of certain terms required for specific performance, the author in 49 Arn. Jr.,
Specific Perforrnance, Section 22, at Page 35
uses this language :
The contract must be free from doubt,
vagueness and ambiguity, so as to leave
nothing to conjecture or to be supplied by
the court. It must be sufficiently certain
and definite in its terms to leave no reasonable doubt as to what the parties intended, and no reasonable doubt of the
specific thing equity is called upon to have
performed, and it must be sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the court may
enforce it as actually made by the parties
( 423 P.2d at 493).
8

This rule is especially applicable to complicated mining industrial transactions. Anierican Mining Co. v.
Him1'od-Kiniball Mines Co., 124 Colo. 186, 235 P.2d
804 (1951).
The1·e are at least three critical and essential
omissions from the July Letter. These are ( i) the
term of the mining lease contemplated by the parties,
(ii) the form of conveyance which would have been
required of Defendants if Tosco had elected to purchase the claims and (iii) the clarification of the
term "appropriate investment restrictions" which
Defendants would have been required to give upon
receipt of the Tosco stock.
Of critical importance is the omission in the July
Letter of the term of the lease. There is ample and
conclusive authority for the proposition that a lease
term is essential in a mining lease. For the sake of
brevity, reference is made here only to two cases.
The first is Martin v. Hall, 219 Cal. 234, 26 P.2d 288
(1933).
Appellant alleges execution of a written agreement for a lease [oil and gas] on August 8,
1928. The written agreement is not set forth
haec verba in the answer and cross-complaint.
As described by appellant it is uncertain, indefinite, and incomplete, particularly in that
it fails to fix a date for commencement of the
lease or to fix any term of duration. (Citing
authority.) (Emphasis supplied.) (26 P.2d
at 290.)
The second case is Warren v. Gary-Glendon Coal
9

Co., 313 Ky. 178, 230 S.vV. 2d 638 (1950). In that
case the Big Jim Coal Company made two offers to
Warren relative to certain coal lands. The second
offer took the following form:
Offer No. 2
September 19, 1946
We offer to lease with the option to purchase
the same properties mentioned in Offer No. 1
at lOc per ton royalty on coal mined (1h of
royalty to be put in escrow from the 131 acre
tract). Minimum rental $100.00 per year.
Option on the 131 acres $5,400.00 ( 1h to be
put in escrow). Option on the balance $2,600.00 or a total of $8,000.00. Any royalties
paid to apply on the purchase price if and
when purchased. The right to use all the surf ace and timber to be the same as if owned by
us. No royalty to be paid on coal mined from·
the tract of land lying on the watershed of
Caney Creek, and if and when this tract is purchased it is to be transferred in fee.
The Hmvell ti·act where home is to be reser\'0d.
This contract is to be written out in full later
on as the final elaborate agreement between
the parties.
In adjudging that the second offer did not constitute a contract which could be specifically enforced
the Court stated:
It is fundamental that in order to enable a
court of equity to decree specific performance,
the terms of the contract must be clear, definite, certain and complete. . . .
When we apply the rules set out in the above
paragraph to this loosely drawn and indefinite
10

instrument, it is manifest that it is not the
character of contract that a court of equity
will specifically enforce. The tinie it was to
begin and to end was not stated ... (Emphasis
supplied.) (230 S.W. 2d at 640)
In opposition to the argument that the lease
must have a definite term, Tosco relied upon D.A.C.
Uranium Co. v. Benton, 149 F. Supp. 667 (Dist. Colo.
l 956), during arguments to the Trial Court. The
lease before the court in Benton had a definite term,
i.e., the lease was to continue so long as the property
was developed during six months of each year. It is
significant that the court in Benton quoted as follows
from Carlson v. Bain, 116 Colo. 526, 182 P.2d 909
( 1947) :
We have said that under the Authorities, to
create a valid contract of lease but few points
of mutual agreement are necessary; first,
there must be a definite agreement as to the
extent and bonds of the property lease; second,
a definite and agreed term; ... (Emphasis
supplied.)
The July letter is silent as to the form of conveyance with which the Defendants would convey the
claims if Tosco had elected to exercise the option
to purchase. Was the conveyance to be made by quit
claim deed or deed with warranty or without warranty? In any transaction involving real estate, the
form of conveyance is critically important. See, for
example, Venino v. Naegle, 99 N.J. Eq. 183, 131 Atl.
895 (1926), wherein the Court of Chancery in refusing to decree specific performance stated:
11

In the document unde1· examination it \Viii
have been observed that many of the usual
provisions of contracts for the pm·chase and
sale of real estate are omitted. As was pointed out in the opinion in the Tansey case, it
does not disclose what all the terms of the
formal agreement were to be; neither does it
specify whether or not it was to contain provisions for default of payment of inte1·est and
taxes. No rnention is made of the charactel'
of deeds by which the title was to be conveyed.
These defects I feel are fatal to the complaintant's suit. (Emphasis supplied.) (131 Atl. at
895.)
If Tosco had elected to exercise the option to
lease the Larson lands, Tosco would have then been
obligated to deliver 5,000 shares of its common stock
to the Defendants.

Subject to delivery to it [Tosco] of appropriate
ini•est?nent representations from the recipients
and subject to such other terms and conditions
as may, in the opinion of its counsel, be required for compliance with the Federal Securities Laws. (July 25 portion of July Letter,
Pl's. Ex. 2, p. 2.) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no evidence in the record to clarify or
indicate the meaning of "appropriate investment
representations."
No authorities have been discovered which define the term "appropriate investment representations.' The noted authority, Words and Phrases,
omits the phrase entirely.
12

It is clear that investment i·epresentations by

the Defendants to Tosco would be a very material
consideration from the viewpoint uf both parties.
However, the absence of language in the July Letter
which would define or indicate what the representations would be, how they would operate, and the
length of time during which such representations
would be effective, constitutes a further significant
omission.
The essential omissions notwithstanding, it is
clear that the July Letter, in and of itself alone, constituted a mere agreement to agree and could not,
therefore, serve as the basis for a decree of specific
performance. In the Restatement, Contracts, § 26,
Comment A ( 1957), the authors state:
Parties who plan to make a final written instrument as the expression of their contract,
necessarily discuss the proposed terms of the
contract before they enter into it and often,
before the final writing is made, agree upon
all the terms which they plan to incorporate
therein. This they may do orally or by exchange of several writings. It is possible thus
to make a contract to execute subsequently a
final writing which shall contain certain provisions. If parties have definitely agreed that
they will do so, and that the final writing shall
contain these provisions and no others, they
have then fulfilled all the requisites for the
formation of a contract. 011 the other hand, if
the preliniinary agreement is inc01nplete, it
being apparent that the deterrnination of certain details is deferred until the writing is
13

made out; or if an intention is manifested
in any way that legal obligations between the
parties shall be deferred until the writing is
made, the preliminary negotiations and agreenients do not constitute a contract. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The fact that the July Letter, in and of itself
alone, constituted only an agreement to agree clearly
appears from the document itself. The July 25 portion of the July Letter provides:

In conversations held between Mr. Frederick
H. Larson, who was in telephone contact with
Mr. Fred V. Larson, and who was representing the shareholders of Larson Oil Co., and
Mr. Koolsbergen and various members of the
Tosco staff in New York on July 9 and 10,
as recorded in Mr. Albert F. Lenhardt's memorandum of July 11, and a subsequent meeting
on July 24 in Los Angeles, the understandings
described below applicable to the holdings of
Larson Oil Co. were reached. The purpose of
this letter is to state the iritention of Tosco
and the shareholders of Larson Oil Co., as
nwdified on July 24, to hereafter enter into
contracts and agreements gi'uing expression
to those understandings as they pertain to
the holdings of Larson Oil Co . ... (Emphasis
supplied)
I have asked our attorneys to commence the
drafting of the necessary documents to carry
out these understandings and reduce them
to formal agreements and would appreciate
your prompt reply.
What clearer indication could there be that the
parties had not completed negotiations and agree14

men ts as to all aspects of the subject transaction?
The evidence adduced during trial conclusively demonstrates that the parties had not reached final agreement as of July 25, 1963.
Koolsbergen described the practice of Tosco in
purchasing mining properties, which was utilized
in this case, as follows :
·when we contemplate going in to acquire reserves, real property, before we decide to
spend a lot of time and put money in on drafting docunients, and putting people to work and
preparing agreements, we want to to take a
quick look sometimes for the very simple reason to see if the properties are there. ( Emphasis supplied.)
The second thing is, is it worthwhile to continue the next step, which is the negotiation of
the contract. (Emphasis supplied.) (TR-1 p.
78,L17-25.)
Pursuant to this practice, Tosco had a cursory
examination of the properties made by Mr. Warriner,
of De Witt, Smith & Company in August of 1963 (TR1 p. 80 at L 12-17), i.e., one month after execution
of the July 25, 1963 memorandum.
·with reference to the July Letter (Pl's. Ex. 2),
Koolsbergen further testified:

Q.
A.

Yes, but so far as you and Mr. Larson
were concerned, and the other Larsons,
there was no agreement as to the term
of the lease?
There was no agreement as to term, be15

cause that was supposed to be negotiated
in the option agreement and subsequently.
(TR-1, p. 83, L. 26-30.)
With reference to a title examination of the
Larson properties, Tweedy testified:
The memorandum of July 25 provided an
agreement between the parties as to what the
option might contain, but further provided
that drafts would be prepared setting forth the
terms and transactions. I would not have
undertaken the very extensive process of examining titles to 30,000 acres of unpatented
oil shale claims without having assured myself
that there was an agreement between my client
and the optionor. (TR-1, p. 114, L. 4-13).
With reference to the formula set forth in the
July Letter, Tweedy was of the opinion that a stated
purchase price would be to the benefit of both parties, and that such could be determined in the course
of negotiations:
Yes, it [July 25, 1963 memorandum] contained a formula, and I think that I suggested to
Mr. Dufford, that it might be better if we
could get the parties, in the course of negotiation, to come up with a specified dollar amount.
(TR-1 p. 133 at L. 15-18.) (Emphasis supplied.)
As further indication that the July Letter was
not complete as far as Tosco was concerned, the
testimony of Tweedy with regard to warranties and
form of conveyance is important:
[vVith reference to the drafts which were pre16

pared], we have some provisions here for the
form of deed and again representations and
warranties. I wanted to get from Mr. Larson
more representations and walTanties than
Mr. Dufford wanted Mr. Larson to give. (TR1p.133 at L 21-36.)
vVith reference to Larson's refusal to execute
the drafts prepared by Tweedy in February, Tweedy
testified:

Q.
A.

Actually there was no specific instrument
in existence that he [Larson] assured you
that he would sign,
That is correct; you and I had not finished negotiations. (Emphasis supplied.)
(TR-1p.148 at L. 8-12.)

Most important is the testimony of Koolsbergen
during Tosco's case in chief relative to the July
Letter:

Q.

But is it your position that with respect
to the Larson-Oil Shale Lease, July 25,
1963, that that memorandum created no
binding agreement?

A.

I am not a lawyer. To me it was a document which was offered, it contained the
terms of an offer, and so far as I was
concerned, we were not bound and he
was not bound until the document was
signed. We never in our life go into an
extensive transaction with just a one
or two page memorandum especially
when you deal with people who are either
not interested enough to enter a transaction, to really understand it, and that
17

is why I always insist that complete
documents are being prepared, which are
understood by counsel and understood hv
the parties and then they are signed, not
before.
Q. This never happened then in connection
with the Larson transaction?
A. That never happened.
Q. You never got what you called a complete
agreement, understood by counsel and
the parties, that was signed?
A. No, I was told by Mr. Tweedy, that we
could expect such an agreement. (TR-1
p. 170 at L. 26-30; p. 170 at L. 1-18).
As conclusively demonstrating that the parties
never did reach an agreement based upon the July
Letter, and that many areas which the parties considered essential were to be negotiated, one need only
refer and compare the drafts of Tweedy ( Pl's. Ex.
14, 16, 17 & 18) and Larson's counsel (Pl's Ex. 17
& 18) with the July Letter. At this point, reference
is made only to the disagreements of the parties as
evidenced by the various drafts, i.e.,:
1.

There was no agreement as to a lease term;

2. There was no agreement as to whether stock
would be exchanged or cash in lieu thereof;
3. There was no agreement as to the procedure
to be utilized in connection with acquisition of patents;
4. There was no agreement as to whether title
18

documentation would be certified or uncertified;
5. There was no agreement as to the purchase
price to be paid in the event an option to purchase
was exercised;
6. There was no agreement as to the terms of
payment for the purchase price in the event the option to purchase was exercised; and
7. There was no agreement as to the warranties to be made by Larson in connection with the conveyance of the Larson properties, nor the form such
conveyance was to take.
The contract as alleged by Tosco being incomplete and a mere agreement to agree, there is no basis
whatsoever for a decree of specific performance.
B.

THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SUSTAINS THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE OPTION PERIOD COMMENCED JULY 15, 1963
AND ENDED JANUARY 15, 1964.

Tosco concedes in its Brief that the parties on
July 11, 1963 agreed that the option period would
commence July 15, 1963 and terminate January 15,
1964 (Tosco Brief, p. 5). This same oral understanding was confirmed by the parties subsequent to the
letter of July 25, 1963 as conclusively evidenced by
the following:
1. Larson testified that this was a clear understanding of the parties both on July 11and25, 1963;
(TR-1 p. 24 at L 17; p. 33 at L 1; p. 186 at L 8);
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2. The July Letter involves two transactions,
closely related, i.e., terms proposed for acquisition
of the Larson holdings, and, Larson'8 efforts to secure contiguous properties for Tosco. It is evident
that the parties intended to initiate their efforts on
both phases of the transaction as soon as possible.
For the sake of brevity, only one quotation is taken
from the July 11 portion of the July Letter:
In addition [to the Larson holdings] there are
about 15 small parcels of patented shale lands
contiguous to the Larson and Skyline properties and totaling about 14,000 acres ... Mr.
Larson feels he could put the parcels together
in a single package again for Tosco. Tinie is
of the essence, however, since three or four
approaches have been nwde to some of these
people in the past few weeks. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Although no commencement date for Larson's employment is stated in the July Letter, Larson commenced employment on July 15, 1963 and concluded
his employment on July 15, 1964, and was paid on
that basis by Tosco; (TR-1 p. 47 at L 9-11).
3. The drafts prepared by Tweedy on July 18,
1963 after consultation with Koolsbergen (TR-1 p.
85 at L. 5-12) specifically provided that the ~rms
of the option to lease would be from July 15, 19!33 to
January 15, 1964. (Pl's. Ex. 15 & 16).
4. Options and Leases prepared by Lai '.m's
counsel and mailed to Tweedy and Tosco on or al mt
December 13, 1963 specified the same beginning a id
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ending dates for the period of the option to lease, i.e.,
from January 15, 1963 to January 15, 1964. (Pl's
Ex. 4 & 5).
5. The drafts prepared by Tweedy as late as
Febmary 11, 1964 (Pl's. Exs. 17 & 18), and presented by Tweedy to Larson during the latter part
of February, 1964, specifically provided that the option period would commence as of July 15, 1963 and
encl January 15, 1964.
6. Larson advised Tosco on numerous occasions of his understanding that the option period
commenced July 15, 1963 and ended on January 15,
1964. At no time did Tosco object to Larson's interpretation or attempt to contradict same, until the
telephone conversation between Tweedy and Larson
in February of 1964 and after the expiration of the
option period. In fact, Koolsbergen wrote to Frederick V. Larson by letter dated August 3, 1963 expressing his pleasure at the agreement of the parties:
I am delighted to arrive with you and your associates at an agreement concerning the lands
owned by you and the Larson Oil Company.
These lands will be a significant contribution
to the oil shale industry in the West. I am
hopeful that you, yourself, will be able to assist us in arriving at a plan for the best utili,' zation of the Larson oil shale lands. I hope
that you will be able to provide the necessary
guidance to our attorneys and engineers in
,, bringing the property into production.
1
I am also hopeful that you will be able to go to
'
Denver and assist in presenting testimony
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regarding your early experience in the oil
shale lands. Such testimony will help us to
bring the lands to patent. (Emphasis supplied). (Defs'. Ex. 24.)
7. Notices of Larson's position as to the termination of the option period were transmitted to
Tosco by Larson's memorandums of November 21,
1963 (Def's. Ex. 20 & 21) and his memorandum of
December 13, 1963 (Def's. Ex. 3). The November 21
memorandum stated:
If the option to lease is exercise on January
15, 1964, Tosco will be obigated to convey 2,500 shares of Tosco stock 1,250 shares to Frederick H. Larson and 1,250 shares to Dorothy
H. Larson). (Emphasis supplied.)

The December 13 memorandum stated:
Enclosed are copies of Option and Lease on the
Fred V. Larson patented lands and copies of
Option and Lease on the Frederick H. Larson
unpatented lands. . . .
Under the terms of our agreement, my fa th er
and mother will be entitled to $10,000.00 at the
time of signing the leases. . . .
The enclosed option and lease referred to contained
a commencement and termination date for the option
of July 15, 1963 and January 15, 1964. (Pl's. Ex.
4 & 5).
8. On January 14, 1964 Lenhardt, while in
New York City at the Tosco offices, called Larson
and acknowledged that the Tosco option expired
January 15, 1964 and also requested of Larson an
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extension of the option period (TR-1 p.198 L. 14-30).
Larson refused to grant the extension and Lenhardt
then told Larson that Tosco would try to pay the
$20,000.00 as soon as it had the funds. (TR-1 p. 199
L. 1-4). The testimony in this regard was uncontraclicted.
9. Larson received a letter from Tosco dated
.January 16, 1964 requesting him to advise S. D.
Leidesdorf & Co., auditors for Tosco, of any amount
clue Larson as of December 31, 1963 (Def's. Ex. 23).
Larson answered this inquiry advising that Tosco
was indebted to the Defendants in the amount of
$20,000.00 as consideration for the options which
expired on January 15, 1964 (Def's. Ex. 25).
10. On or about January 31, 1964, Tosco paid
the Defendants the $20,000.00 by four separate
checks (Pl's. Ex. 7) each in the amount of $5,000.00.
Checks to Frederick V. and Ethyl B. Larson had a
notation showing that it was issued for "options
granted," and each check was signed by Koolsbergen
and Joseph A. Marks, treasurer of Tosco. Koolsbergen acknowledged that the checks were prepared
before he signed them (TR-1 p. 97 L. 1-8). On
February 3, 1964 the treasurer of Tosco wrote to
Larson (Def's. Ex. 10) requesting that Larsen acknowledge receipt of the four Tosco checks which
were paid by Tosco "pursuant to the agreement."
11. As late as March 23, 1964, in a memorandum prepared by by Winston, Tosco's counsel,
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reference was made to disputes arising out of the option agreement dated July 15, 1963. (Def's. Ex. 19).
In light of the foregoing, it is critical to analyze
Tosco's contention that there is insufficient evidence
to support the Trial Court's findings.
Tosco contends that Larson's testimony is incredible (Tosco's Brief p. 21-22). The Trial Court
had the opportunity to assess the conduct and appearances of the witness on the stand, the reasonableness
of the testimony, the accuracy of the recollection of
each witness, and to analyze the inclination of each
witness to speak the truth; the Trial Court obviously
believed the testimony of Larsen and did not believe
the testimony of Koolsbergen and Tweedy.
Tosco then has the audacity to state, with reference to the option period,
There is not a single, solitary contemporaneous
document proving, or even tending to support,
the existence of the oral agreement claimed by
Defendants. No letter, no memorandum, no
note, no diary entry; nothing in evidence prior
to Defendants' February 1964 repudiation of
their contractual obligation states that the option commenced to run in July, or at any other
time prior to the time clearly and expressly
provided in the July 25 written agreement.
(Tosco Brief, p. 21).
Tosco thus ignores and attempts to obscure contents of the documents referred to in paragraphs
numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9, supra.
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This Court has stated on numerous occasions
that when there is competent evidence in the record
to support the Trial Court's findings, such findings
will not be set aside on appeal. See e.g., Pitcher v.
Lcrnritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P. 2d, 491 (1967).
C.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED
EVIDENCE OF ORAL AGREEMENTS AS TO
THE OPTION PERIOD.

1. Parol evidence is admissible to show the
effective date of a contract.
Even though parol evidence as to the effective
date of a contract conflicts with the date shown on
the contract, such evidence is admissible as affirmed
by this Court on at least two occasions: General Insnrance Co. v. Henich, 13 Utah 2d 231, 371 P.2d 642
(1962); Olsen v. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 200 P.2d 733
( 1948). In the latter case, this Court stated:

Plaintiff, in making a tender of proof, testified that the contract was not signed on the
date shown in the instrument.
An exception is recognized to the parol evidence rule in the case of dates upon instruments. It is said that the rule that parol evidence cannot be received to contradict a writtent contract does not apply to the date, which
may be contradicted whenever it is material
to the issues to do so, or, if lacking, may be
supplied by parol or other competent testimony. (200 P.2d at 737)
Testimony showing the agreed commencement date
of the option (July 15, 1963) is in effect evidence
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to show the date that the contract became effective.
2.

Parol evidence is admissible because the
July Letter is only a letter of intent.

The authorities uniformly agree that when a
memorandum represents only statements related to a
proposed transaction and does not constitute the
entire agreement, parol evidence is admissible to
show the complete agreement. As stated in Restatement, Contracts,§ 228, Comment a (1937):
It is an essential of an integration that the
parties shall have manifested assent not merely to the provisions of their agreement, but to
the writing or writings in question as a final
statement of their intentions as to the matter
contained therein. If such assent is manifested
the writing may be a letter, telegram or other
informal document. That a document was or
was not adopted as an integration may be
proved by any relevant evidence.

The July Letter itself reflects that it is a mere
letter of intent:
The purpose of this letter is to state the intention of TOSCO and the shareholders of Larson
Oil Co., as modified on July 24, to hereafter
enter into contracts and agreements giving expression to those understandings as they pertain to the holdings of Larson Oil Co.
Larson testified that he and Tweedy agreed there
were many terms in the transaction which were to be
negotiated subsequent to the preparation of the July
Letter. (TR-1p.187 L. 23-30; p. 188 L.1-2.) Kools26

bergen testified that the terms of the lease were to be
negotiated subsequently. (TR-1 p. 83 L. 26-30.) A
comparison of the drafts prepared by the parties
readily shows that negotiations took place as to the
various material terms. (See Pl's. Ex. 14 & 16; compare, Pl's. Ex. 4 & 5 and Pl's. Ex. 17 & 18.)
The July Letter, being a mere letter of intent,
parol evidence was admissible to show the option
period, July 15, 1963 through January 15, 1964.
3.

Parol evidence is admissible to show additional terms of the tramaction.

The Court has recognized on at least two occasions that extrinsic evidence is admissible to show
additional terms of a contract not included in the
written agreement. See Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc.,
10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P.2d 337 (1960); Farr v. Wasatch Chemical Co., 105 Utah 272, 143 P.2d 281
( 1943). In the latter case, this Court stated:
To sustain this ruling of the Court that the
evidence of this prior collateral agreement was
incompetent, counsel invokes the rule that
parol evidence is not admissible to contradict,
add to, or vary the terms of a written instrument. The rule is, of course well established
but it has no application here. The problem
of ascertaining when the rule applies to a
given fact situation is discussed by Wigmore,
Sec. 2430 of his work on evidence. It is there
stated: 'The inquiry is whether the writing
was intended to cover a certain subject of negotiation; for if it was not, then the writing
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does not embody the transaction on that subject* * *. ( 143 P.2d at 282.)
The July Letter provides :
1. Tosco will pay $20,000.00 at the time of
signing of the agreement ($10,000.00 to
Fred V. and Ethel B. Larson, his wife;
and $10,000.00 to Frederick H. Larson
and Dorothy H. Larson, his wife) and will
receive in turn a six-month option during
which it will examine the title, history
and status of the mining claims, the feasibility of patent proceedings and he extent
and minability of the reserves.
Tosco interprets this provision as meaning that the
period of the option did not commence until execution.
of the formal agreements and payment of the $20,000.00 by Tosco. However, the only interpretation
which is justified by careful reading of that provision, is that Tosco was to pay $20,000.00 for which
it would receive an option on the Larson lands for
a period of six months. The beginning and ending
dates of the option period are not specified in that
provision, and the agreement of the parties as to the
option term constitutes an additional provision of
the transaction.
4.

Parol evidence is admisible to show the
meaning of indefinite, vague and ambiguous provisions of a contract.

This Court has recognized that when the terms
of a contract are indefinite and vague, parol evidence
and subsequent writings of the parties are admissible
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to show the meaning of indefinite terms. In Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306
P2d 773 ( 1957), this Court stated:
The sole question before this court, then, is
whether the parties intended by this agreement that respondent should assume the obligation on the note held by Continental Bank.
This intent should be ascertained first from
the four corners of the instrument itself, second from other contemporaneous writings concerning the same subject matter, and third
from the extrinsic parol evidence of the intentions. (Citing authority.) If the ambiguity
can be reconciled from a reasonable interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic evidence
should not be allowed. (Citing authority.) If
the instrument on its face remains ambiguous
in spite of the reasonable construction, the inent may be ascertained in the light of all written instruments which were a part of the same
transaction. (Citing authority.) If the intent
is ambiguous still, then parol evidence may be
admitted, (Citing authority) and rules of construction may be invoked to declare the intention of the parties. (Citing authority.)
Tosco has, in effect, selected one sentence from
the July Letter which serves as the sole basis for their
contention in this case that the option never started
to wit:
Tosco will pay $20,000 at the time of signing the agreements ... and will receive
in turn a six-month option . . .
If this interpretation of the July Letter were
correct, until formal documents were signed and the
1.
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.,.20,000.00 paid, there was no obligation on the part
of either party to do anything, and, there was no con.
1,ractual relationship whatsoever. To the contrary,
this is obviously not what the parties intended, and
.this conclusion is apparent without any reference
.to the acts of the parties subsequent to July 25, 1963.
The July 11 portion of the Letter states:

/

Meetings were held with Mr. Frederick H
Larson representing the Larson Oil Co., and
the TOSCO staff on July 9th and 10th to discuss the acquisition of oil shale properties
owned by Larson Oil Co. and the acquisition o.f
a number of snwll parcels of Ufoh shale lands
located in the vicinity of the Larson properties.
. . . Their holdings [Larson] consist of ap·
proximately 30,000 acres of unpatented shale
lands and 1,000 acres of patented lands lying
to the north and partially to the east of the
Sky line property in Utah.
In addition, there ai·e about 15 small parceb
of patented shale lands contiguous to the Lar·
son and Sky line properties and totaling abou:
14,000 acres ... Mr. Larson feels he could put
the pa1·cels together in a single package agair.
for TOSCO. Time is of the essence, however
since three or four approaches have been nuu/1
to some of these people in the past few weeki
. . . (Pl's. Ex. 2, July 11P.1)
. . . Mr. Larson will be employed as a consul·
tant by TOSCO for up to one year at $1,200.0
per month plus expenses. During this ti1ni
he will work toward assembling the smol
parcels into a single package and assist i:i tl1•
work involved in patenting the Larson Oil 0
1
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lands . . . (Emphasis supplied.) ( Pl's. Ex. "
July 11, P. 4.)
At the conclusion of the July 25 portion of th
Letter, the following appears:

I have asked our attorneys to commence tht
drafting of the necessary documents to carry
out these understandings and reduce them to
formal agreements and would appreciate your
prompt reply.
It is therefore clear that acquisition of the Larson holdings and the acquisition of surrounding acreage was of utmost importance to Tosco, and it was
imperative to initiate efforts to accomplish both
ends immediately. When this obvious interpretation
of the July Letter is compared to the one sentence of
that letter upon which Tosco bases its whole case, at
best, the one sentence becomes vague, indefinite and
ambiguous, and extrinsic evidence was clearly admissible to show the intent of the parties as to the
commencement and ending dates of the option.
D. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS HAS NO APPLICATION TO EXECUTED AGREEMENTS.

Tosco complains that the Trial Court's Findings
as to the option period violate the Utah Statute of
Frauds. Section 25-5-3, U.C.A. 1953. Tosco fails
to consider that the July Letter, as supplemented by
the oral agreements of the parties and their subsequent conduct, constituted an agreement which was
, fully performed by both Tosco and the Defendants.
The Statute of Frauds had no application to a fully
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executed contract. Greenwood v. Jackson, 102 Utah
161, 128 P.2d282 (1942); Cutright v. Union Savings
& Investment Co., 33 Utah 486, 94 Pac. 984 (1908).
Here, briefly stated, the Trial Court correctly determined that Defendants granted Tosco a six-month
option to lease their lands. The agreed term of the
option was from July 15, 1963 to January 15, 1964.
Tosco agreed to pay $20,000.00 as consideration for
the option. Tosco did not elect to exercise the option
and paid the $20,000.00 consideration.
E.

TOSCO DOES NOT ACTUALLY SEEK A DECREE
OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AS TO THE JULY
LETTER, BUT A DECREE REQUIRING DEFENDANTS TO EXECUTE INSTRUMENTS PREPARED
BY LARSON'S COUNSEL, AS AMENDED BY
COURT DECREE, AND THE COURT CANNOT
MAKE A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that the July 25,
1963 letter is a complete and enforceable contract,
but then asks the Court not to enforce the July 25
Letter, as such, but to order Defendants to execute
instruments in the form of Appendix B to its Brief,
which would require execution by Defendants of
documents composed by the Court, not the parties
to the transaction. It is difficult to understand Plaintiff's position in this regard. In the final analysis,
the Plaintiffs now literally ask the Court to enforce
a document, the material provisions of which they
rejected in January and February of 1964 and which
is, in fact, an instrument as to which the Court would
supply the majority of the terms. To illustrate, the
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<)ption and Mining Lease irelating to unpatented
claims (See Appendix B - Pgs. 2b to 29b of Plaintiff's Brief) contains a multitude of provisions which
were not even discussed in the July Letter. The Option portions of these instruments contain not less
than nine separate subjects. Of the total subjects
discussed in the Options, only three were even remotely covered by the July Letter. The proposed
Leases in Appendix B to Tosco's Brief cover no less
than 20 different provisions, of which only six were
specified in the July Letter. Further, of the six provisions specified in the July Letter, all of them have
been amplified considerably to remove the ambiguities, defects and omissions inherent therein. This
Court has consistently refused to supply missing elements of a contract in order to make a complete transaction for the parties involved. Hargreaves v. Burton,
G9 Utah 575, 206 Pac. 262 (1922); see also Pitcher
v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967);
Price 'V. Lloyd, 31Utah86, 86 Pac. 76 7 (1906).

The absurdity of Tosco's present offer (Tosco
Brief, p. 19) to execute an option and lease in the
form of Appendix B to its Brief, becomes obvious
by an analysis of the documents prepared by Tweedy
in February of 1964 (Pl's Ex. 17 & 18) which
graphically demonstrates Tosco's complete rejection
of the July Letter and the attempts of Larson to
finalize the parties transaction.
ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS 17 and 18

Tweedy prepared two separate sets of instru33

ments about February 11, 1964. The instruments
were introduced in evidence by Tosco and identified
as Plantiff's Exhibits 17 and 18. One set of instruments (Pl's. Ex. 17) related to the Larson patented
lands and consisted of an "Option" to which was
attached and incorporated, as Exhibit "A," an instrument to be executed upon exercise of the option
to lease. Exhibit "A" was entitled, "Mining Lease
and Option to Purchase." The other set of instruments (Pl's. Ex. 18) also consisted of an Option
with the Mining Lease and Option to Purchase attached and incorporated as Exhibit "A." Since this
section relates primarily to a discussion of Plaintiff's
Exhibits 17 and 18, the options to lease will be referred to in this paragraph as "Option" or "Options"
and the leases attached as Exhibits "A" will be referred to as "Lease" or "Leases." These Options and
Leases were the drafts which Tweedy discussed with
Larson in California about February 15, 1964. (TR1 p. 138 L-25-30; p. 139 L 1.)
Tosco would have the Court believe that the Options and Leases which were presented to Larson for
consideration on or about February 15, 1964, embodied those few definite understandings which were
related in the July Letter. (Tosco Brief, Page 14,
first paragraph.) However, analysis of those instruments discloses a complete departure from the July
Letter in certain respects. To illustrate:
A. The July Letter (Pg. 2-July 25 portion)
provides:
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If it elects to lease, it will, at the time of the
election, deliver to Fred V. Larson and Ethel
B. Larson, his wife, 2500 shares of its authorized, but unissued, common stock and simultaneously deliver to Frederick H. Larson and
Dorothy H. Larson, his wife, 2500 shares of
its authorized but unissued, common stock ...

The Options and Leases deprived Defendants of said
shares.
The July Letter (Pg. 2, July 25 portion
thereof) provides for payment of delay rental of
$10,000.000 per year for the unpatented claims. The
Option and Lease (Pl's. Ex. 18) relating to unpatented claims also deprives Defendants of this payment.
B.

C. The July Letter, (Pg. 2-July 25 portion)
provides that "Tosco will have the right to drop any
of the unpatented claims which it deems to be unpatentable or uneconomical, but the shareholders
shall have the right to attempt to carry to patent any
claims so dropped by Tosco," but the July Letter
makes no provision for any reduction of the $10,000.00 rental payment if claims are relinquished.
However, the Option and Lease (Pl's. Ex. 17) which
relate to the unpatented claims, contain a provision
for ratable reduction of the annual delay rental payment of $10,000.00, if any of the unpatented claims
are relinquished by Tosco. (See Paragraph 3.2.4 Lease.)
D.

The July Letter is silent as to warranties
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or representations concerning Defendants' title to
the Larson lands. Yet, the Options and Leases would
have required the Defendants to give complete and
unrestricted representations and warranties as to the
validity of their title. (See Paragraph 9 of Options
and Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Leases.) Further,
in Paragraph 19.2 of the Option and Lease relating
to the unpatented areas, Tweedy would have requi1·ed
the Defendants to execute a completely erroneous and
untrue statement, i.e. :
19.2 Patent applications have been prepared in proper form, executed by the proper
parties and filed with the appropriate agency
of the Department of Interim· of the United
States of America in connection with the
claims listed in Schedule 1 of Exhibit "A."
E. The July Letter is completely devoid of any
provision as to the form of conveyance to be utilized
by Defendants in the event Tosco elected to exercise
the purchase option contemplated by Paragraph 7 of
the July Letter. However, the Options and Leases
would have the Defendants convey the patented properties by a general warranty deed (Paragraph 17Lease-Pl's. Ex. 17) and the unpatented claims by
special warranty deed. (Paragraph 18.3-LeasePl's. Ex. 18.)
F. The July Letter does not ex em pt Tosco from
obligation to produce minerals from the Larson lands
in the event it exercised its option to lease. The
Leases, however, contain the following provision:
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15. Obligation to Produce - No statement contained in this Lease shall be construed by implication or otherwise to obligate
Lessee to mine or produce any shale oil or
other metal 01· metalliferous substances from
the Leased Lands during the term hereof or
any extensions or renewals.
This is paiticularly onerous, when coupled with the
40 year lease terms which Tosco would have required
as a condition to execution of the formal agreements.
(Leases - Paragraphs 2.) (TR-1Pg.130 L 8-10.)
G. The Leases would require the Defendants
to submit their lands to Tosco for a period of 40
years "and as long thereafter as Lease Minerals can
be produced from the Leased Lands, or any part
thereof, in commercial quantities." (Leases - Paragraphs 2.) The July Letter contains no provision for
the term of the mineral lease which would be effective upon the exercise of its option by Tosco. If this
case did not involve such serious subjects, the prospects of Tosco's insistence upon a 40 year lease term,
its withdrawal of the $10,000.00 annual delay rental
provision and its exemption of any obligation to develop or produce, might provide some amusing speculation as to the plight of the Defendants.
H. The July 25 Letter has no provision concerning abstracts or other title data. However, Paragraph 3 of the Options would require the Defendants
to obtain and deliver to Tosco, without compensation,
currently certified abstracts of title, covering all the
Larson lands which were the subject matter of the
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Options. (See Paragraph 3 - Options.) In addition,
Paragraph 3 of the Options would compel the Defendants to deliver to Tosco, without compensation,
all title data, engineering reports and data, patent
applications and other documents.
The July Letter has no provision remotely
suggesting a so-called "Lesser Interest" clause. However, the Leases provide (Paragraph 10) that if the
Lessor [Defendants] owns less than the entire and
undivided fee estate in the Leased Claims, a proportionate reduction would be made in all payments
otherwise due the the Defendants under such Leases.
Insertion of the Lesser Interest clause in the Lease
relating to the unpatented claims (since it relates to
the "entire and undivided fee estate") would have the
effect of nullifying any payments otherwise due the
Defendants under the Lease, at least until the claims
were patented.
I.

J. In addition to the omissions and conflicts
discussed above, the Leases contained numerous other
provisions which were not specified in the July
Letter.
Larson's rejection of the Tweedy drafts of February 11, 1964 (Plaintiff's Exhibits 17 and 18) is
the act which Tosco relied upon to accuse him of
repudiating the transaction. (TR-1 Pg. 144 L 1328.) It becomes readily apparent that he was given
no choice, but to reject the documents offered.
Tosco will undoubtedly argue that several provi38

sions in the Options and Leases were taken directly
from instruments prepared by Larson's counsel in
December of 1963 (Plaintiff's Exhibits 4 & 5). In
part, this is a correct statement. However, it must be
kept in mind that Plaintiff's Exhibit' 4 and 5 were
prepared by Larson and his counsel in an attempt to
successfully conclude the transaction contemplated
by the July Letter and supplemental oral agreements
and to offer Tosco a formal agreement which it would
exercise with possibly minor changes.
A vital element to be considered in consideration
of this dispute is the fact that Tosco, at least until it
filed its Brief with the Court, had never offered to
execute any instrument which embodied the material
provisions of the July Letter (TR-1Pg.144 L 13-18).
II. DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO TOSCO'S ARGUMENT C.
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS 4 AND 5
AND FINDINGS 4, 5 & 7 ARE SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE.

Tosco contends that the Trial Court erred in
reaching Conclusions of Law numbered 4 and 5 and
Findings of Fact numbered 4, 5 and 7, because the
evidence does not justify such conclusions and findings. Conclusions of Law numbered 4 and 5 are:
4. Having permitted the option period
to expire, the Plaintiff is not now entitled to
an order of this Court adjudging that Plaintiff
is entitled to an additional six months option
covering the Larson lands.
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5. Judgment should be entered herein
dismissing the Complaint with prejudice and
providing that Defendants are entitled to recover their costs of suit incurred therein.
Tosco also asserts that Findings of Fact numbered
4 and 5 are contrary to the plain language of the July
Letter. Finding No. 4 is:
4. When they executed Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, the parties intended to prepare and
execute formal instruments expressing the
complete and entire transaction which they
contemplated. Plaintiff agreed to prepare such
formal instruments and submit them to the
Defendants for their consideration.
Finding No. 4 is supported by the evidence and
is not contrary to the language of the July Letter.
An examination of the July Letter dispenses with
Tosco's position in this regard. The letter states
that its purpose is:
. . . to state the intention of Tosco and
the shareholders of Larson Oil Co., as modified
on July 24, to hereafter enter into contracts
and agreements giving expression to those
understandings as they pertain to the holdings
of Larson Oil Co. (Emphasis supplied.) (See
Page 1 of the July Letter.)
The last paragraph of the July Letter provides:
I have asked our attorneys to commence
the drafting of the necessary documents to
carry out these iinderstandings and r·educe
them to formal agree11ients and would appreciate your prompt reply. (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, Finding No. 4 is unequivocally supported
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bv testimony of Mr. Koolsbergen, Tosco's president,
~ho said, "There was no agreement as to term, be-

cause that was supposed to be negotiated in the option
agreement and subsequently," (TR-1 Pg. 83 L 2930) and by its attorney, Mr. Tweedy, who testified,
"The memorandum of July 25 [July Letter] provided
an agreement between the parties as to what the opiion miqlit contain, but further provided that drafts
would be prepared setting forth the terms and transoction ." (TR-1 Pg. 114 L 4-8.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Tosco argues that its commitment to prepare
urafts setting forth the understandings embodied in
the July Letter was not an agreement to do anything. This position is so incredible that it does not
deserve comment.
As to its Finding No. 5, the Court could hardly
have found otherwise. Finding No. 5 is:
5. Contrary to the terms of Plaintiff's
Exhibit 2, Plaintiff did not prepare formal
instruments expressing the transaction contemplated by the parties. In fact, at no time
subsequent to July 25, 1963, did Plaintiff prepare, offer to prepare, or offer to execute any
instrument which complied with Plaintiff's
Exhibit 2.
1. The testimony of the same Tosco witnesses,
Mr. Koolsbergen and Mr. Tweedy, supports the Trial
Court. During cross-examination, Mr. Koolsbergen
testified:

Q.

Are you aware that Mr. Tweedy's draft
arrived in my office on the 22nd of July?
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A.

No, I am not aware of it. I would not be
surprised if that was the case.
Q. Now what other drafts did Mr. Tweedy
prepare, what other drafts did he prepare
in response to your instruction?
A. I can't state for Mr. Tweedy's, so far as
I know, none. (TR-1Pg.86 L 15-23.)
Q. But there was no question, was there Mr.
Koolsbergen, that it was Tosco's attorneys who were going to prepare the
drafts?
A. I don't think so, I think it was Tosco's
attorneys and Larson's attorneys.
Q. Well, I want to know from you, Mr. Kools- .
bergen, whether or not after July 25,
1963, Tosco's attorney prepared any
drafts at all.
A. So far as I know, they didn't, but that is
my knowledge. (TR-1 Pg. 87 L 9-19.)
Mr. Tweedy, in response to questions propounded
by Defendants' counsel, testified:

Q.

A.

But you do agree, Mr. Tweedy the draft
that you mailed to me, which bears your
office stamp of July 18, 1963, was not in
compliance with the memorandums of
July 25, 1963? [July Letter]
No, Mr. Koolsbergen said that he had instructed his attorney to submit drafts. It
was his understanding, and it was my
understanding, that he was referring to
the documents that had been transmitted
to you for the purposes of initiating this
particular transaction.
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Q. That is not answering my question.
THE COURT: It was his understanding, or
yom· understanding?
A. It was my understanding.
Q. (By Mr. Dufford) My question was, did
the draft that bears your date of July 18,
1963, did it comply with the terms and
conditions of the memorandum of July 25,
1963? [July Letter]
MR. ASHTON: If the Court please, I don't
see how it could. This agreement of July
25 had not yet come into existence.
MR. DUFFORD: I will withdraw the question.
Q. (By Mr. Dufford) Did you ever submit
a draft, Mr. Tweedy, to either Mr. Larson
or to me, which complied with the memorandum of July 25, 1963? [July Letter]
A.

Q.
A.

Q.

A.

No, I had submitted my draft prior to
that time.
Did you have something to add?
Until I submitted drafts in February in
response to your drafts. ( TR-1 Pg. 143
L. 1-27).
When did The Oil Shale Corporation, to
your knowledge, eve1· tender an instrument to the Larsons for signature, that
incorporated the terms of the July 25,
1963 agreement? [July Letter]
I don't think it ever did expressly incorporate all of those terms. (TR-1 Pg. 144
L 13-20.)
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Tosco maintains that Finding No. 7 is not supported by the evidence. In its argument to sustain
its position, Tosco ignores the testimony of Lal'son,
who testified that he told Mr. Tweedy, in January
of 1964, the Tosco option had expired and that Defendants did not intend to discuss any further deal
unless and until they had been paid the $20,000.00
consideration for the option which had expired. (TR1 Pg. 28 L 11-25.) Although Tweedy and Koolsbergen offered conflicting testimony, Larson's statement is corroborated by:
(i) payment of $20,000.00 by Tosco
with four separate checks (Pl's. Ex. 7) each
beal"ing a notation showing issuance fol' options granted, (Pl's. Ex. 7),
(ii) the written memorandum ( Defs'.
Ex. 19) of March 23, 1964, by anothel' attorney representing Tosco, i.e., Mr. Winston
wherein it was stated, "Fred Larson and I
met this morning in Washington to discuss
the possibilities of compromising the differences which have arisen between Larson and
The Oil Shale Corporation concerning their
respective rights under the option agreement
datedJnly 15, 1963 ... "(at Page 1), and
(iii) the term of Larson's employment
agreement with Tosco, although not stated
in the July Letter, was verbally agreed between the parties to commence on July 15,
1963 and end one year later on July 15, 1964,
and was performed on that understanding.
(TR-1 Pg. 72 L 18-25.) (Emphasi~ suppl~ed.)
According to Tosco, there was no testimony md144

eating its recognition that the payment of $20,000.00
was the result of an oral understanding (Plaintiff's
Brief Pg. 41). However, Tosco overlooks the following portions of the record:
1. The four checks (Pl's. Ex. 7) issued
by Tosco to Defendants, bearing notations as
to options granted:

2. Larson's testimony concerning payment of the $20,000.00, including his refusal
to talk about any other deal until the payment
had been made. (TR-1Pg.28 L 11-25.)
3. Payment by Tosco of $20,000.00 in
response to Larson's demand.
4. Tosco's acquiescence in Larson's repeated warnings that the Tosco option expired
on January 15, 1964. (Pl's. Ex. 3 and Defs'.
Exs. 20 & 21) (TR-1 Pg. 196 L 15-30, Pg. 197
& Pg. 198 L 1-10.)
5. The telephone request by Lenhardt,
Tosco's executive vice-president, requesting an
extension of the option period and the payment
of $20,000.00 following Larson's refusal to
extend the term. (TR-1Pg.198 L 14-30.)
The Trial Court's Finding No. 7 is further supported by the memorandums (Pl's. Ex. 3 and Defs'.
Exs. 20 & 21) written by Larson to Mr. Koolsbergen.
Each of these memorandums clearly indicate to Tosco
that its option concerning the Larson lands would
expire on January 15, 1964. Also, Larson orally advised Tosco on several occasions that the option would
expire on January 15, 1964. (TR-1Pg.196 L 15-30,
45

Pg. 197 and Pg. 198 L 1-10.) Although maintaining
that it did not agree to the period of the option as
stated by Larson, it is strange that no one employed
by or associated with Tosco refuted the Defendants'
position as to the option period, until after the option
had expired on January 15, 1964. It is highly significant that the payment of $20,000.00 was made to
the Defendants by four checks, mailed with no transmittal letter setting forth the conditions (if, in fact,
any such conditions existed as testified by Tosco's
witnesses) under which such payment was made. It
is difficult to believe that practices of this nature
could be attributed to a large public corporation
whose affairs were directed by individuals having
the business experience of Messrs. Koolsbergen and
Tweedy.
Perhaps the most astonishing positions taken by
Tosco, however, relate to the circumstances under
which the $20,000.00 was paid and the conduct of
their Executive Vice-President, Lenhardt.
Tosco contends that the $20,000.00 was paid
based upon Larson's assurance to Tweedy that documents would be executed (TR-1 p. 148 at L. 8-20) if
Tweedy and Larson's counsel could resolve certain
differences which then existed between Tosco and
Defendants.
Tosco is obviously a large corporation, and its
president has an impressive background. (TR-1 pgs.
63, 64 & 65) . He does not allow the corporation to
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spend substantial sums for title and property examinations unless formal documents have been signed
(TR. 1. p. 71 L. 24-30), but he asks the Court to
believe that he would authorize payment of $20,000
without execution of formal documents and upon,
as he and Tweedy testified (TR 1 p. 148 L. 23-28;
p. 100, L. 17-20), the strength of a nebulous promise
by Larson to sign documents still to be negotiated.
Yet the checks issued to Defendants recited they
were for options granted, (Pl's. Ex. 7).
Tosco had legal representation throughout this
transaction by both Winston and Tweedy, their experienced and capable counsel.
It is therefore inconceivable that Tosco paid
$20,000.00 upon Larson's unqualified assurance that
the Defendants would execute something to be negotiated and just as inconceivable that Tosco could,
under such odd circumstances, pay $20,000.00 to Defendants without a letter of Transmittal or some
other writing specifying in detail the conditions
under which payment was made, or by requesting
Defendants' written confirmation of such conditions
prior to payment. Logic compels the conclusion, after
consideration of all circumstances which surround
payment of the $20,000.00, that Larson demanded
payment of the $20,000.00 as a debt which Defendants believed was due and payable. Tosco obviously
agreed and paid with full knowledge of Defendants'
position. Conversely, one would be forced to ignore
the dictates of credibility to believe that Larson knew
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and agreed, as Tosco contends, that Defendants'
acceptance of the $20,000.00 would create an obliga.
ti on on the part of Defendants to sign some form of
document which would provide Tosco with a future
six-month option to lease the Larson lands. The Trial
Court resolved these discrepancies in favor of De.
fendants.
At this point, it is interesting to observe that
even at this late date, Tosco does not ask the Court
for enforcement of a mining lea.se, but, rather an
additional six months option, during which time it
would have the right to lease the La.rson lands upon
exercise of the option. Even by giving full weight to
all of Tosco's testimony, there is nothing in the recol'd
of this case even remotely suggesting that Tosco paid
$20,000.00 upon Larson's promise to give Tosco a
further and additional six months option. ( TR-1 p's.
121, 126, 147 & 148; p. 100L17-20.)
Compare the position of Tosco to the actions of
their executive vice-president, Lenhardt. Lenhardt
was the author of the July 11 portion of the July
Letter, and served as executive vice president of
Tosco. Lenhardt called Larson in January 1964 re·
questing an extension of the option period, and \vhen
Larson denied the request, assured Larson that Tosco
would pay the $20,000.00 due as soon as the necessary
funds could be obtained (TR-1 p. 199 L 1-6). To
explain these actions, Tosco attempts to point out
three times in its brief that Lenhardt had allegedly
no knowledge or participation in the Larson transac48

tion after July 11 and until his phone call to Larson.
(Tosco Brief, p. 6, 10 and 27). This is the executive
vice president of the company who officed with Larson in Beverly Hills, California subsequent to July
15, 1963. (TR-1 p. 198 L. 8-18). This is the executive
vice president who called Larson from New York,
where Koolsbergen officed. (TR-1p.198, L. 14-30).
This is the executive vice-president of a company who
considered the Larson transaction sufficiently important to involve two attorneys, Winston and
Tweedy, and to directly involve the company president. This was a transaction involving 31,000 acres
of land, and one which the executive vice president
felt obligated to request an extension for, without allegedly conferring with either the company president
or company counsel. This position is consistent with
the strained interpretation of all facts of this case
taken by Tosco throughout its Brief.
III. DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO TOSCO'S ARGUMENT D
A.

TOSCO IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL.

Tosco opines that it should be granted a new
trial on the grounds that the Trial Court's Findings
and Conclusions constituted "surprise." However, it
is a foregone conclusion in any contested proceeding
that one of the litigants must be "surprised" at the
result. While Tosco may be entitled to some compassion as the unsuccessful party, its disagreement with
the Trial Court's ruling does not entitle Tosco to a
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new trial. Indeed, if "surprise" is justification fol'
a new trial, any litigant who diligently avoids adequate trial preparation can be guaranteed surprise
when the trial judge's decision is known.
Tosco's basis for its accusation of surprise appears to arise out of the Defendants' reluctance to
accept, without question, the Plaintiff's assertion
that the July Letter, of and by itself, is a complete
and definite agreement which can be specifically
enforced.
Assuming, only for purposes of argument, that
Tosco's surprise theory is entitled to the Court's
consideration, the Defendants' reluctance to accept
Plaintiff's position with respect to the July Letter
could hardly have come as a surprise to Plaintiff.
This case was initiated by Tosco in October of 1964.
The Defendants filed their Answer 1 which clearly
indicated Plaintiff's position, i.e., that the transaction between Tosco and Defendants was expressed by
the July Letter and other oral understandings which
were not specified in the July Letter. Again, at the
commencement of the trial in Provo, Utah on June
22, 1966, Mr. Ashton, one of the attorneys for Plaintiff, made the following remarks concerning the
Defendants' position:
It was indicated, I think, at the first go around
in chambers, that the Defendants apparently
are relying on some kind of an oral agreement.
We [Plaintiff] are relying on a written agreement which was dated July 25 ... (TR-1, Pg.
5 L 5-10.)
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The Defendants' position has always been that the
transaction between the parties was expressed by
the July Letter and the oral understandings that:
(a) Tosco's option to lease would commence on July 15, 1963 and terminate on January 15, 1964, during which period the Defendants would not negotiate or contract with
other parties for the sale or lease of their lands,
(b) Larson's employment con tract
would be for a period of one year, commencing
July 15, 1963 and
( c) Other essential and material provisions contemplated by the parties would be
negotiated and resolved subsequent to July 25,
1963. (See Paragraph 1 of Defendants' First
Affirmative Defense.)
Further, it has always been Defendants' position
that the transaction expressed by the July Letter
and the oral understandings did not, as of July 25,
1963, constitute a complete and definite agreement
which was capable of being specifically enforced.
(Defs'. Trial Memorandum, Pg. 14.)
Defendants maintained in their Trial Memorandum, filed with the Trial Court (also part of the
record on appeal) that the actions of the parties from
July 15, 1963 to January 15, 1964 created a situation
under which Tosco had the benefit of .an exclusive
option on the Larson lands, which they failed to exercise and permitted to expire. (Defs'. Trial Memorandum, Pg. 14.)
It is significant that Tosco cites only one case
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(Nichols v. lVhitacrc, 12 Mo. App. 692, 87 S.\V. 594)
in support of its position that Defendants' so-caller!
change of theory misled Tosco and caused it to change
its trial procedures. However, Nichols involved a
jury and the improper instruction was not consistent
with the evidence. Certainly one can appreciate thr
havoc which might result from granting of an improper instruction to the jury, which changed the entire tenor of a case before it. Similar situations are
not encountered in a trial to the Court. Tosco forgets
that it, not Defendants, dictated the tenor of this case.
Therefore, it is incredible that the Plaintiff would
allow statements by Defendants' counsel or their witnesses, to change the manne1· of their presentation or
their theory of the case. Is it logical to believe that
Tosco instantly changed its modus operandi upon
hearing remarks of Defendants' counsel at the commencement of trial? To arrive at the proper answer
here, one need only look at Tosco's Reply to the Defendant's Trial Memorandum and note that Tosco's
alleged disadvantage, created by the so-called change
of theory, was not a matter of concern until the Trial
Court first decided this case in favor of Defendants,
even though Defendant's position was specifically
stated in their Trial Memorandum, at Pages 14 and
15 thereof.
B. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RESTITUTION.

In Section D of its Brief, Plaintiff contends that
if the Court does not decree specific performance of
the July Letter, then the Court must order the De52

fendants to return the $20,000.00 they have received.
It is Defendants' position that there is no basis
for restitution in this case, because the Trial Court
found that the July Letter, and oral understandings
of the parties and their actions and conduct created
an agreement whereby Tosco had the advantage of an
option on the Defendants' lands from July 15, 1963
to January 15, 1964, which option was permitted to
expire by Tosco and for which it paid $20,000.00 as
consideration. (See Trial Court Findings 3, 6 and 7).

This involves a situation where Tosco chose not
to acquire the Larson lands on the basis of the July
Letter, as supplemented by the oral understandings
of the parties. Obviously it wanted to reduce the cost
of its acquisition of the Larson lands, but when that
course of action proved unsuccessful, it then took the
position that it had been wrongfully induced to pay
$20,000.00 to Defendants on the strength of Larson's
assurance that Defendants would execute some kind
of document, the contents of which were still to be
negotiated. It is particularly significant that there
was absolutely no behavior or statements on the part
of Tosco's representatives which refuted Larson's
testimony, until after the expiration of the Tosco
option on January 15, 1964. Conversely, every memorandum and all of Larson's acivities during the
period from July 15, 1963 to January 15, 1964, corroborate Larson's testimony.
The Court's Findings were based upon evidence,
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both oral and documentary, in which it accepted Larson's testimony over that of Tosco's witnesses,
Tweedy and Koolsbergen. This conflicting testimony,
was determined by the Trial Court in favor of the
Defendants after a long and careful review of the
record in this case. Those findings, being supported
by the record, should be upheld by this Court.
Having paid for a six months option which it had
on the Larson Lands and having ignored and rejected
Larson's attempts to bring the transaction to the
point of execution of formal agreements, Tosco is
not entitled to now claim that its $20,000.00 payment
should be reimbursed.

CONCLUSION
The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
THERALD N. JENSEN
190 North Carbon Ave.
Price, Utah
DUFFORD AND RULAND
P.O. Box 459
Grand Junction, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondents.

54

